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INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION
TRANSACTIONS: AN ESSAY ON LAW IN
AN INFORMATION SOCIETY
Raymond T. Nimmer*
INTRODUCTION
The world has changed.
The services and information sectors of the economy have
outstripped the goods sectors in size and importance. That
economic change resulted from increased demand and a rapid-
ly expanding technological capability to deliver information
and services without regard to distance and at minimal cost.
The resulting change for businesses is profound.' It affects
business structure as well as how companies engage in trans-
actions.2 The change for law will also be profound.
Internet accelerated this, of course, but even without the
Internet, the social and economic changes were inevitable and
many had already occurred. Online digital systems of all types
create a "death of distance." That death of distance affects how
one does business and how people and organizations interact.3
It affects how law should be formulated.4 Indeed, it ultimately
* Leonard H. Childs Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center;
BA, JD, Valparaiso University.
1. See Bernard Wysocki, Jr., The Big Bang: Some Industries May Find Them-
selves Blown Apart by the Digital Age, WALL ST. J., Dec. 31, 1999, at B34 ("infor-
mation about objects is quickly becoming more valuable than the objects them-
selves").
2. See Joseph B. White, The Company We'll Keep: Corporations Aren't Going
to Disappear; But They're Going to Look a Lot Different, WALL ST. J., Dec. 31,
1999, at B36. "[Hiaving a lot of physical assets now doesn't make you an impor-
tant company .... In the future, corporations will define more of their value by
intangibles-the creativity of their designers ... the proficiency of their software
architects . . . the knowledge of marketers . . . and even the strength of their cul-
ture .... " Id.
3. See generally FRANCES CAERNCROSS, THE DEATH OF DISTANCE: How THE
COMMUNICATIONS REVOLUTION WILL CHANGE OUR LiVES (1997).
4. See, e.g., Paul Edward Geller, From Patchwork to Network: Strategies for
International Intellectual Property in Flux, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNATL L. 553 (1998);
David R. Johnson & David Post, Law & Borders-The Rise of Law in Cyberspace,
48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996); Raymond T. Nimmer, Licensing on the Global Infor-
mation Infrastructure: Disharmony in Cyberspace, 16 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 224
(1995).
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affects how we will see the world of commerce and society.
Changes of the sort our economy has experienced often
engender calls for regulation. Sometimes these are based on
real concerns about real substantive issues. More often, they
are based on a desire to use law to retain (or return to) the
former status quo. But there are no illustrations where that
effort succeeded in the face of true economic, social and techno-
logical change. Modern information markets are, and should
be, largely defined by agreements and market choice, rather
than by regulation. In effect, the market chooses its own direc-
tion, restrained only at the extremes by law. Policy statements
in the United States and elsewhere routinely support that core
principle. Yet, that aspiration is not always achieved. There is
a fundamental issue today about the nature of the law that
should apply to economic activity in computer information. The
proper answer is that law should support transactional choice
and not regulate it except where the regulation is clearly es-
sential to fundamental public policy, the achievement of which
clearly outweighs the cost of regulation.
This essay explores several themes in this international
information age. First, I discuss the blurring engendered by
information systems, new methods of contracting, and the
change from a goods-centric market to an intangibles-centric
economy. These changes have created a far more diverse mar-
ketplace for information than has ever existed. The diversity
covers both different substance and different rights. It affects
how information is dealt with. The diversity is shaped primari-
ly by technological and market forces, including contract terms,
rather than traditional intellectual property rights rules. That
is significant for commerce. It is also significant for law be-
cause it changes the relationship between intellectual property
law and the modern marketplace.5
The diversity also blurs traditional categories of business
and law. Once relatively stable lines between services, goods
and information products are no longer as clear or, even, sus-
5. Of course, these same influences have also created new diversity in goods-
based markets, changing many of the ways in which vendors or buyers of goods
interact. For example, as this was being written, the three largest automobile
manufacturers in the United States announced their intent to create an electronic
marketplace for suppliers, based in part on an auction model of selling and buying
supplies for the manufacture of automobiles.
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tainable. Information technology enables both the automation
of services and the mass customization of information prod-
ucts. Indeed, it also enables mass customization of what we
formerly treated as simple goods, sold' on a mass market for
general use. The changes are important for law since, by and
large, legal regimes applicable to commerce are grounded on
classifications grounded in the older economy. In recognizing
the shift in these categories, we will need to reexamine the
terms under which law responds to transactions involving the
newly blurred groupings. We need different tools for under-
standing the role of law and the appropriate approach to facili-
tate commerce while structuring rules to avoid real abuse in
the new context.
My second theme deals with a change that is perhaps even
more obvious to the casual observer, but which presents equal-
ly fundamental challenges to law pertaining to information
commerce. The same processes that cause the blurring of cate-
gories are causing a physical uprooting of commerce. The in-
tangibles (information and services) market is global in nature
in a manner never seen before. This creates issues about the
scope of state sovereignty and about the degree of sustainable
cost caused by uncertainty, conflict and inadequacy of law
globally. Ideas of physical location and physical distance are
shattered in Internet where a licensor (vendor) and licensee
(customer) can as easily interact across thousands of miles as
they can across their own backyards. Where either party is
located at the time of any particular transaction and where the
information or service is delivered or provided is ultimately a
circumstantial, rather than an essential element of the con-
tractual relationship. We are left, then, with an entirely new
form of business enterprise and, at present at least, with only
the beginnings of answers in how to adjust the idea of applica-
ble law and the foundations of sovereignty to reflect that new
context.
When viewed from the business perspective, these phe-
nomena open new possibilities for commerce. When viewed
from the more limited vantage of law and legal policy, the
death of distance and the physical uprooting places a new vivid
emphasis on how we go about determining what law should
govern an information transaction. I argue that the basic
premise in making that decision should be to support the new
methods of contracting and of delivering information electroni-
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cally on a global basis. Given that premise, choice of law
should be governed by the agreement of the parties. In the
absence of agreement, the choice-of-law rules should provide a
clear rule that supports transactions by reducing legal compli-
ance costs.
Finally, I discuss several issues dealing with the basic
nature of contracting in electronic commerce relating to com-
puter information. Throughout the world, states and countries
have begun to address how contract law should be structured
(or restructured) to accommodate the different modes of enter-
ing into contractual relationships and performing them in
online environments. And the methods of contracting are in
fact different. The online world entails a new level of automa-
tion in contracting, a different method of recording assent and
the terms of a contract, and a different type of interaction
between the provider and client than was true in the paper
world. In each of these respects we need to adapt our concepts
about the technology and practice involved in commercial con-
tracts, making sure that while the adaptation reflects the new
context, it does not respond to unwarranted desires to restrict
or restrain new commerce where no adequate policy grounds
other than an uneasiness with change justify the restrictions.
Rather than survey the full range of contract law issues
here, I focus on two. The first deals with whether electronic
(digital) records or actions satisfy requirements in law for
written papers and written signatures. As most who have
discussed this question have concluded, it seems clear to me
that electronic records should fulfill writing requirements ex-
cept perhaps in limited extreme cases where there is a clear
reason in policy to insist on an actual writing or an actual
written signature. In a world consistently moving further and
further into widespread use of and reliance on digital systems,
it is anomalous to act in law as if digital records are not satis-
factory surrogates in most cases; the laws requiring writings
were enacted in a world where that format was the only com-
mercially available means of recording information. Most new
state laws and uniform law proposals have responded to this
fact by proposing a doctrine of equivalence or adequacy, gener-
ally supplanting statutory requirements for a writing by mak-
ing their digital counterparts adequate in law. Yet, some now
propose that there should be procedural preconditions for use
of electronics in some cases, that there must be initial and
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continuing agreement to use, and that a lengthy list of mostly
consumer-related rules be treated as requirements that cannot
be met by electronics. The rationale for these steps appears to
be grounded principally in fear of new technology, rather than
reasoned belief that a substantive harm is created by allowing
use of electronic systems. If broadly adopted, however, the
harm to commerce and the degree of dissonance created be-
tween law and modern social and business practice could be
substantial.
The second theme deals with the idea of assent in an
online environment. Under U.S. law, as carried forward in the
proposed Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act
(UCITA), assent can be shown by conduct indicating assent.6
This is important in online information commerce because
many (most) contract-causing interactions are in whole or in
part the result of remote, automated activity, where conduct
rather than words or writings prevail. UCITA validates that
semi or fully automated contracting activity, while putting into
place several procedural safeguards. Early proposals for a
European Union Directive on Electronic Commerce similarly
validate the concept of contract formed by conduct. There ex-
ists the possibility of a global, validating structure, which also
provides protections against inadvertence and mistake in mod-
ern electronic commerce activities.
I. BLURRING: INFORMATION MARKETPLACE AND BLURRED
CATEGORIES
We know the first premise: "the economy has changed."
Yet, it is another thing to come to grips with the consequences
it has for law and business. The changes are fundamental and
have been so rapid that there is some tendency intellectually
to reject them, clinging to the belief that what existed in the
past has not truly changed. Yet, the first premise inevitably
yields a second: the change in the economy has profound conse-
quences for how we view commerce and how law should re-
spond to it.' While some are unwilling to accept this reality,
this unwillingness is an ordinary and predictable result when
6. UNIFORM COMPUTERS INFORMATION TRANSACTIONS ACT § 112 (1999) [here-
inafter UCITA].
7. See, e.g., M. ETHAN KATSH, LAW IN A DIGITAL WORLD (1995).
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a fundamental paradigm shift occurs.8 The emergence of new
paradigms is always accompanied by professional insecurity.
Uncertainty breeds resistance. But that cannot forestall reali-
ty.
There has been an exponential change in the commercial
and social role of information assets and value associated with
them. That change affects how businesses and business activi-
ties are organized. It is characterized by an increased demand
for digital products and services along with an increased flexi-
bility in how commercial activities can be organized. The de-
mand generates and has been generated by a technological
revolution coupled with an economic revolution. The conse-
quence is a fundamental change. We no longer live in the
world of our fathers or mothers. We live in a new world. The
new world consists of blurred product, service, and information
categories, along with fiercely competitive new methods of
doing business and new forms of commercial subject matter.
One aspect of the new information economy lies in elec-
tronic commerce.9 Properly understood, electronic commerce
envisions new marketplace and new methods of doing business
enabled by the convergence of computer information technology
and the development of information and services as the center-
piece of the new economy. In discussing legal issues in elec-
tronic commerce, we must avoid the fallacy of the old market.
This is a new environment. It differs in what business models
apply, what is sold or licensed, how it is made available, across
what distances, and what information is available to purchas-
ers.
10
8. See generally THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLU-
TIONS (3d ed. 1996).
9. Electronic commerce will be the single most important factor in expanding
international trade in this new century. Predictions range from $330 billion (U.S.)
by 2001-02 and $1 trillion (U.S.) by 2003-05. See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC
COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL IMPACT OF ELEC-
TRONIC COMMERCE: PRELIMINARY FINDINGS AND RESEARCH AGENDA 27 (1999).
10. Among the numerous illustrations of this change in the market is the
emergence of the "auction" as a format for major transactions involving not only
consumer products, but also a vast array of commercial products. In a relatively
simple illustration of this, as this was written, three large auto manufacturers
announced plans to establish an Internet auction framework for acquisition of
parts for constructing new automobiles. The open auction format would allow man-
ufacturers and suppliers to partake in an open-information environment that could
not be duplicated without the special capabilities of global information networks
and the scaled changes that have occurred in transportation services. See Keith
[Vol. X=V:I
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Children of the past were weaned on a mass-market in
consumer goods. They often assume that the issues in electron-
ic commerce are also those of a consumer mass-market. Yet,
electronic commerce is not primarily that. Most value ex-
changed online in electronic commerce today occurs between
businesses. Business-to-business transactions in electronic
commerce exceed consumer transactions by a huge factor and
are expected to grow at a rapid rate." There are many rea-
sons for this of course, and a number of them relate to the fact
that electronic commerce opens a new trading format with
global characteristics for businesses.
Beyond business-business trade, however, computer infor-
mation systems make former concepts of a mass-market less
pertinent. The primary value in the information market lies
not in toasters, televisions, or drill presses, but in information
and services. Modern information systems and the contracting
practices that support them enable tailoring services and prod-
ucts to fit niches, rather than mass markets. This enables a
new format for distribution that is especially relevant to infor-
mation industries. It entails "mass customization." 2 An infor-
mation product can be put in commerce generally (available to
the mass audience) and yet simultaneously customized for
particular clients by the provider, the recipient, or automated
operations. In a single, online posting, I can simultaneously
offer a database consisting of all reported decisions of U.S.
state and federal courts, and numerous tailored databases
focusing, for example, solely on decisions in the state of Texas
or decisions of the U.S. Tax Court. The data, once placed in a
form for marketing, can be subdivided by software techniques
without requiring new products or production. The price for
each of the databases can be made to reflect the market de-
mand.
Computer information systems and the shift toward digital
Bradsher, Big 3 Automakers Join Forces on Internet New Business-to-Business
Venture Would Streamline Purchasing of Supplies, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Feb.
26, 2000, at D1, col. 2.
11. See, e.g., GartnerGroup Says Business-to-Business E-Commerce Transactions
Becoming More Global (visited Mar. 28, 2000) <http//www.gartner4.gartner-
web.corn/pub . . . tic/aboutggpressrel/pr02l600.html>. The Gartner Group forecasts
business-to-business e-commerce to be greater than $7 trillion by the year 2004,
rising from a level of over $145 billion in 1999. Id.
12. See generally STANLEY M. DAVIS, FUTURE PERFECT (1987).
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delivery of information and services allow products to be dupli-
cated at minimal cost and distributed electronically. This re-
duces the need for large capital and complex distribution sys-
tems. As a consequence, many providers in computer informa-
tion markets are small. While there are large companies, every
individual entrepreneur is or can be an information or services
provider. A small company in Maine can interact with a large
company in Australia for the same cost as if it were selling to
its neighbor. The average size of a U.S. software company is
less than 12 employees.
A. Market Differentiation
We will focus on information markets, rather than on the
effect of information systems on business structure. When we
do this, it is clear that the information economy entails a bur-
geoning diversity. The new types of services, resources, busi-
ness models and the like do not reflect chaos, but rather a
vibrant competition. There is an expanding and changing array
of options, products and services. Businesses that have a
chance of surviving understand this. But lawyers have not yet
addressed the importance of this new diversity in information
products and services for law.
On what basis are these diverse products and services
structured?
There are numerous answers to this. One practical answer
is simple: the basis lies in the response of the market and in
economic opportunities. Sustainable distinctions in products
ultimately depend on whether the distinct products attract a
positive market response. In the computer information econo-
my, value does not lie mainly intangible assets. As a result,
the capability to tailor products is amplified. An automobile,
once built, can be modified only with substantial, costly and
skilled effort. A computer information database, on the other
hand, ordinarily carries with it the inherent capability to alter
its structure or utility with relative ease.
There are some who think that, because the economy deals
with information, the basis of product differentiation must lie
in intellectual property law. That is not true. Even viewed
from the narrow perspective of law, there are many and wildly
different bases on which information or information-based ser-
vices are differentiated in the modern information economy.
[Vol. XXVI:I
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Some lie in the nature of the information. But even for other-
wise identical information, differentiation occurs through con-
tract terms, 3 technology controls on use of the information, 4
and the ability to deliver similar information in different ways
that fit different value configurations. Diversity in the market-
place is created and supported in various ways and no one
source dominates. Instead:
* Some hinge on differences in the information itself.5
* Some hinge on who compiles the information.
* Some hinge on how information is compiled.
* Some hinge on technology restrictions on use of informa-
tion.
* Some hinge on how the information is delivered.
* Some hinge on how often information is delivered.
* Some hinge on control of tangible property.
* Some hinge on contract terms.
* Some hinge on intellectual property rights.
13. See, e.g., DSC Communications Corp. v. Pulse Communications, Inc., 170
F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1999); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir.
1996); Frontline Test Equip., Inc. v. Greenleaf Software, Inc., 10 F. Supp.2d 583
(W.D. Va. 1998).
14. Technological controls shape the scope and nature of uses of, or access to,
copyrighted and other types of information products. This was recognized in the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act with the exception of some uses that qualify as
fair use under applicable copyright law. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (1998). It has also
influenced the development of WIPO copyright treaties on an international level.
15. At the "atom" level, each of these consists of bits of information on a
medium from which it can interact with other machines or with humans. If the
medium is the same and there were no visible labels, an observer could not tell
the difference between the three until they were used in an appropriate machine.
But the atoms and bits have entirely different meanings and functional content in
terms of their use and their commercial relevance.
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Many of the factors that differentiate the information market
have both a legal and a practical basis.
The modern information market is different from the pre-
digital information world. In this context, it is pertinent to ask:
what is the continuing role of intellectual property rights? If
we look at the old world (of the 1950's and 1960's) we could say
that, at least in the mass-market, we had intellectual property
law rules that fit the then-ordinary modes of transfer. Now, we
have different modes of transacting and a differentiated mar-
ket based on new criteria. One thing is clear: any legal re-
sponse cannot be to simply transport old ideas to new com-
merce hoping to force it back into old molds. As we say in
Texas: that dog won't hunt.
B. Services and Information
I have been referring to the services and information sec-
tors. In the information economy, the line between these cate-
gories blurs, causing a need to reconstruct how we treat them
in law and policy. 6 Computer information systems are a pri-
mary factor in the expansion in international commercial sig-
nificance of commercial "services" industries. Modern informa-
tion systems enable automation and remote delivery of, or
access to, services. Indeed, many information products resem-
ble former services products more than they do former infor-
mation products.
Historically, the idea of "services" connotes the reality of
"not goods." The idea of "information" also connotes "not
goods." However, just as applicable law applies differently to
goods as compared to services, it has different application to
information as compared to either goods or personal services. A
distinction between "goods" and "services" has importance in
international trade since multilateral agreements hinge differ-
16. See, e.g., STAN DAVIS & CHRISTOPHER MEYER, BLUR: THE SPEED OF
CHANGE IN THE CONNECTED ECONOMY (1998).
Clearly, it no longer makes sense to think of the world in terms of prod-
ucts and services. Instead, we should be thinking more broadly of prod-
uct-service hybrids--offers" in [our] lexicon. Offers are "productized" ser-
vices and "servicized" products. They're both fish and fowl, if you like.
And more frequently, it will be hard to sell anything that doesn't rep-
resent that combination.
Id. at 7; see also ROBERT B. REICH, THE WORK OF NATIONS: PREPARING OUR-
SELVES FOR 21ST CENTURY CAPITALISM (1992).
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ent obligations on the distinction.1 Similarly, multilateral
agreements separately address information rights as a trade
issue, independent of services or goods.
Yet, this is not a world where the labels of the past long
survive. Their breakdown affects law in complex ways. Consid-
er, for example, individuals who provide investment advice to
clients (e.g., stock market, commodities). The advisors previ-
ously dealt personally with individual clients, creating a natu-
ral limit on the number of clients that could be serviced, the
total fees that could be charged, and the physical relationship
between where the advisor and the client were located. The
computer information world, however, allows various alterna-
tives which enable the advisor to automate and mass-produce
customized advice. These involve the development and distri-
bution (for a fee) of interactive digital information products. Is
that distributed, interactive computer information product
properly treated as automated information, interactive goods,
or impersonal services? The answer to these questions affects
what law can be applied to the computer information.
One court held that this type of product is information,
which cannot be regulated under the First Amendment. 18 The
court emphasized that, while regulation of professional services
is permitted in U.S. law, regulation of speech is generally not
permitted. The court summarized its view in the following
terms:
[The Commission] is attempting to protect the public against
false doctrine. That is, the Commission seeks to protect'the
public from obtaining and acting upon advice and recommen-
dations offered by persons who it believes are not adequately
qualified. In this regard, [it] is attempting to act as the
watchman for truth for the public.'"
17. See John Gero & Tom Oommen, Electronic Commerce and Trade Poli-
cy-The Government's Role, 25 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 323 (1999); General Agreement on
Trade in Services, 33 I.L.M. 1168 (1994) [hereinafter GATS]; General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.9. 194
[hereinafter GATT].
18. See Taucher v. Born, 53 F. Supp. 2d 464 (D.D.C. 1999).
19. Id. Cf. Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee v. Parsons Tech., Inc.,
1999 WiL 47235 (N.D. Tex. 1999), vacated as moot, 179 F.3d 956 (5th Cir. 1999)
(holding that Quicken Family Lawyer, an interactive software program, violated
Texas unauthorized practice of law statute).
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That is not language that a court would use in discussing regu-
lation of a service provider. ° Yet, properly programmed and
enabled to receive online updates, the computer software can
replicate on a mass basis the advice that the advisors other-
wise provide directly and in person to individual clients. The
line for purposes of regulatory competence between services in
person and automated information products that interact with
a client is not clear.2 Of course, the court was not asked to
address a second classification question: was distribution of the
software a transaction in "goods"? The answer to that question
might have significance in determining the nature of liability
risk that the advisors undertake in their new method of distri-
bution.
Yet, the advisors were not limited in practice to the two
methods of distributing their value that we have discussed:
personal contact or interactive software. It would be equally
possible for them to place the automated, interactive system on
the Internet, charging a fee for persons who access it. This
frees the system entirely from any tangible means of distribu-
tion and, equally important, frees the advisors entirely from
any geographical or national limits. However, what is or
should be the response of governments and regulatory entities
to this step? Does First Amendment protection remain intact
or is the advisory system now a "service"? Which country has
the capacity to regulate it or to prevent such regulation?
II. PHYSICAL UPROOTING: THE DEATH OF DISTANCE
An information contract can be created and performed
electronically across large distances with little cost, time, or
effort. This uproots information transactions from physical
location and it does so in a way that the traditional goods-
based commerce cannot comprehend. This uprooting allows the
delivery of services and of information through remote, auto-
20. Another court approached similar facts differently, not questioning the
constitutional issue, but allowing regulation where the advisors also offered to
place trades for customers. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. AVCO Fin.
Corp., 979 F. Supp. 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
21. A difference exists between services associated with knowledge-based bene-
fits which can be automated and widely distributed, and services tied to the par-
ticular place where the individual provider exists (e.g., restaurant services). See
REICH, supra note 16.
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mated systems. It enabled a new multinational business com-
petition. This competition, unlike multinational competition in
goods, is not limited to large multinational companies. Many
players in this new market are quite small.
Businesses and business entrepreneurs view this as an
immense new opportunity. In law, however, uprooting creates
a new complexity that throws open concepts of sovereignty,
what law controls, where any legal actions may be brought,
and how national protections or regulations translate into a
truly global environment. These issues are important because,
in computer information transactions, there is great diversity
in fundamental approach to legal issues among states and
internationally.
There are differences in contract law among U.S. states
and between the United States and other countries. In old
commerce, the impact of the differences was controlled by the
nature of commerce; goods transactions ultimately are bounded
by the location or destination of the particular goods. With the
shift to information commerce, the effect of the differences in
law expands exponentially. That there are important differenc-
es cannot be doubted:
* There are differences in Texas consumer law as contrast-
ed to Maryland.
" The consumer law of European countries is different
still.
* The law of New York differs from the law of California
on idea submissions.
" There are international differences in protection of free
speech.
* U.S. states differ on the existence of an obligation of
good faith in performance.
* Eight (or less) states have adopted the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Contracts § 211(3) which invalidates some "unex-
20001
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pected terms" in contracts, while over forty have not.'
" European statutes abrogate certain "unfair terms" in
contracts, many of which terms are common and enforce-
able in the United States.
* And on and on ....
All of this has been true for generations, of course, but the
death of distance changes the stakes as does the shift from a
goods-based economy to an information and services economy.
Consider, for example, a company that publishes and sells
analytical articles on various issues. It creates the works in
one country and makes them available to customers in other
countries, including France and Iran. In the paper-based infor-
mation world (similar to the goods-based world), to distribute
to France and Iran requires an affirmative choice to send tan-
gible objects into those countries. To create a market in those
countries requires transportation costs, a distribution system,
investment to support these, and advertising to encourage
purchases. In electronic commerce, in contrast, this can be
done digitally without a distribution system (other than
Internet) and with very small investment. There must, in fact,
be an affirmative effort to stay out of those countries; doing so
may be impossible.
The case with respect to goods is only slightly less affected
by electronic commerce and its global capabilities. Agreements
can be made electronically without regard to distance or actual
contact between individuals, but the television set, toaster,
engine or drill press that is the subject of the contract must
itself eventually be delivered into the purchaser's country. The
need for shipment and delivery locks the transaction into a
location and tangible focus. Of course, as is characteristic of
the modern economy, there have arisen a variety of
transportation (services) companies that specialize in small,
rather than large loads, which enables vendors to deliver prod-
ucts outside their local region quickly.
The prerequisites for actually engaging in international
22. See James J. White, Form Contracts Under Revised Article 2, 75 WASH. U.
L.Q. 315 (1997).
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commerce under the old systems and the nature of the old
subject matter ensured that there would be a conscious choice
to enter transactions in a jurisdiction and, often at least, an
opportunity to examine the law and practice in target coun-
tries. In electronic information commerce, the electronic sys-
tems lies in part in their ability to create ubiquitous distribu-
tion points without significant incremental cost. Yet, that value
is reduced when we inject legal risks and costs of identifying,
complying with, avoiding, or risking breach of the law of all
affected jurisdictions since that means literally all countries
and states in the world.
From a public law perspective, uprooting creates difficult
problems about the meaning of national (or state) sovereignty
and about methods of asserting sovereignty in a truly global
network. The death of distance attenuates the relevance of
sovereignty as a general. principle. Yet, that very effect creates
incentives for states to seek to reassert power in this new
context. From a commercial transaction perspective, the up-
rooting creates uncertainty that clashes against the opportuni-
ties that the new systems create for businesses dealing in
information.
A. Contract Choice of Law
What law applies?
Traditional methods of deciding this within the United
States and internationally rely on location: location of a trans-
action, location of performance, the location of an effect, etc. to
reach a conclusion about which laws control.23 Alternatively,
23. See Perry Dane, Vested Rights, "Vestedness," and Choice of Law, 96 YALE
L.J. 1191 (1987); AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CON-
FLICT OF LAWS (1934). Choice of law under the Restatement generally followed a
"vested rights" approach. For contracts dealing with personal property or services,
it breaks down essentially to three parallel rules. The first, applicable to questions
of validity, such as consideration and capacity, requires application of the law of
the location where the contract was made. See id. § 332. As a result, the Restate-
ment devotes substantial attention to defining when and where a contract is creat-
ed. The basic principle describes the place of making as the location at which "the
principle event necessary to make a contract occurs." Id. § 311 cmt. d. That event,
according to the Restatement differs depending on the type of contract involved
and on whether the contracting occurred in a person to person context or over a
distance through the use of mail, telephone and the like. The following primary
rules apply: 1) formal contract: place of delivery, see id. § 312; 2) unilateral con-
tract: place of offeree performance, see id. § 323; and, 3) bilateral contract: place of
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they rely on a court determining which state or country has
the most significant interest in the transaction.2' These indi-
cia for choice of law are attenuated and often made irrelevant
by the fact that physical location in electronic information
commerce has little or no importance. Trade in information
occurs without regard to distance or borders. Guessing what
law governs a given electronic contract or a group of electronic
commerce events is just that, a guess. It is a guess that occurs
in a context where the consequences of being wrong can be
quite significant.
From a transactional perspective, the resulting uncertainty
and risk entails cost and, in some cases, an impossibility of
compliance (e.g., country A requires a step that country B
prohibits). The desire to reduce cost and avoid conflict leads to
a need to stabilize what law applies, either in terms of what
state's law governs or in terms of harmonizing the substantive
provisions of potentially applicable law. The alternative is that
parties are subject to inconsistent and often indeterminate
rulesY The question is how to stabilize the law applicable to
offeree promise, see id. § 325. In defining the place of a promise for purposes of
contracting at a distance, the Restatement uses a mailbox rule, making the prom-
ise effective when sent and then goes on to specify illustrations of this rule appli-
cable to mail, telegraph, and telephonic contracting. Id. § 326. See Ian R. Macneil,
Time of Acceptance: Too Many Problems for a Single Rule, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 947
(1964).
24. See generally WILLIAMvi M. RICHMAN & WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, UNDER-
STANDING CONFLICT OF LAWs 241 (2d ed. 1993); Patrick J. Borchers, The Choice.of-
Law Revolution: An Empirical Study, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 357, 372 (1992)
(more than twenty years after the promulgation of the Restatement (Second) with
its radically different approach to choice of law, approximately thirty percent of
U.S. states continued to use the old doctrine and the new doctrines as adopted in
other states were not uniform). Modern choice-of-law theories refer to governmental
interests, while others refer broadly to the idea of "contacts", some of which entail
ideas of location. The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws uses a similar test,
describing a test that requires consideration of various factors including the: (a)
place of contracting, (b) place of negotiation, (c) place of performance, (d) location
of the subject matter of the contract, (e) domicile, residence, nationality, place of
incorporation and place of business of one or both parties, (f) needs of the inter-
state and international systems, (g) relative interests of the forum and other inter-
ested states in the determination of the particular issue, (h) protection of justified
expectations of the parties, and (i) promotion of certainty, predictability and unifor-
mity of result. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971).
25. Based in part on this risk, UCITA proposes that absent fundamental pub-
lic policy or specific, mandatory consumer rules, the parties can by agreement
establish what law governs their transaction. In the absence of such contractual
choice, an online transaction in computer information is governed by the law of
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the global transactional context of electronic commerce.
There are various approaches, all of which will ultimately
contribute to an international solution of the problem of com-
plexity in law and regulation in global electronic commerce.
One approach argues for international harmonization of
law to supplant conflicting rules and to fill important gaps
where no law exists at all. Greater uniformity is clearly impor-
tant as the information economy emphasizes global commerce
in a way that did not exist before. UCITA, as well as directives
in Europe and initiatives in the United Nations, address this.
We need more of that effort. We especially need more of it for
commerce in services and information. But full harmonization
is an impossible dream. It may be socially undesirable since
the richness of global society consists in part in its diversity. In
any event, the issues in harmonization and the differences in
cultural approach are too complex and too diverse to resolve in
the foreseeable future.26 While waiting for harmonization, tril-
lions of dollars of commerce transpire in electronic commerce
subject to costs associated with national laws built for older
forms of international trade.27
There is a way out. Harmonization efforts assume that a
common ground can be established and that a controlling force
should be formal legal rules. An alternative view is that, rath-
er than a controlling force, law should support the marketplace
and contract choices, subject to restrictions that prevent abuse
and choices that contradict fundamental public policy. Most
states in the United States enforce contractual choices of
the licensor's location. UCITA § 109.
26. For example, a Convention on the International Sales of Goods dealing
with basic contract law issues was developed based on United Nations sponsorship
and approved by a number of countries. However, even though it deals with the
much more stable and settled law relating to goods, the Convention is often not
used by parties and, in any event, by its own terms applies only to true interna-
tional transactions between entities located in two different countries.
27. See Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on Certain
Legal Aspects of Electronic Commerce in the Internal Market, COM(98)586 final at
2 [hereinafter Proposed EU Directive]. How can that be, a lawyer might ask. This
reflects a myopic view of business that is uniquely lawyerly in character. It can be
because for business, legal risk is simply one of many forms of risk that any area
of commerce entails. It is a risk (read cost) that should be minimized, but not one
the existence of which is necessarily disabling, especially when one realizes that
thousands of transactions occur without legal problems or disputes for every one
that has any semblance of a legal dispute raised with respect to it.
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law;2" that rule is restated in UCITA."9 It is generally fol-
lowed in the Restatement. The rationale, even extrapolated to
global commerce, is simple. Commerce consists of markets and
markets are shaped by choices. These choices are best able
generally to establish rules of the road for commercial transac-
tions. If a party makes information or services available on
terms that provide that the law of a designated state governs
contract issues and the other party does not refuse that term,
that agreed designation should be enforced in order to allow
the parties to shape their own deal and identify their own level
of risk. In UCITA, the contractual choice is reined in by the
requirement that it not violate fundamental public policy of the
otherwise applicable state law.3 ° In addition, UCITA provides
that the contractual choice of law cannot alter the effect of a
mandatory consumer protection rule which cannot otherwise
be altered by agreement under the law of the state whose law
would otherwise have applied to the transaction.
Law in other countries is not always as fully accepting of
contract choices, especially in consumer transactions. European
rules, for example, allow contract choices to govern in commer-
cial (business-business) transactions, but invalidate some
choices in consumer contracts. These rules generally invalidate
contract choices that deny the consumer coverage under either
the law of the country where the consumer resides or the law
of the country where the-transaction occurred.
Why do states adopt this rule? The overt explanation is
that of "consumer protection." But in some cases, law other
than the law of the consumer's domicile better protects the
consumer, while in other cases the law of the consumer's resi-
dence will be better. For example, the law of Texas gives the
consumer far greater rights than the law of many other states.
If consumers residing in those other states cannot be governed
by Texas law, they receive less protection.
There is no consumer-protection basis for a mandatory
rule on Internet commerce which requires use of the law of the
consumer's residence and prohibits contrary agreements. In-
28. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1971).
29. UCITA § 109.
30. UCITA § 105(b). See Application Group, Inc. v. Hunter Group, Inc., 61
Cal. App. 4th 881 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998). Cf. Lowry Computer Prod., Inc. v. Head,
984 F. Supp. 1111 (E.D. Mich. 1997).
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stead, the reason lies in protecting sovereign prerogatives. The
policy, although often not explicit, is that contracts should not
alter the rules of a given country or state as to its own con-
sumers because those states have a right to control the rights
of their own residents, wherever they may be. Not surprisingly,
until Internet commerce, few states sought to extend the scope
of their consumer protection law to transactions in other loca-
tions, but now assertions of state sovereignty are common.
If applied generally to electronic commerce, a rule that
invalidates contract choice of law in consumer contracts would
guarantee huge legal compliance costs and legal compliance
risk in electronic transactions. In effect, the rule would mean
that even the smallest e-commerce vendor could not function
on the Internet unless it either: 1) restricted its commerce to
designated countries (or states) in which it knows and can
comply with the law; or, 2) learns and complies with the law of
all countries and all states. The first option creates an undesir-
able and artificial legal restraint on the capabilities for global
information commerce, while the second option states an im-
possible task even for the world's largest companies. At a mini-
mum, such a rule should be narrowed to cover only those rules
that a state determines to be mandatory protections which
cannot be altered by agreement. That approach allows greater
flexibility with resulting cost savings, but retains true consum-
er protections.
B. Choice of Law in the Absence of Contract Terms
In the absence of an agreement that chooses the law appli-
cable to the transaction, what law governs? More particularly,
what rules should determine the answer to this question in a
practical, transactional context?
To answer this, we need to recognize the difference be-
tween rules that determine choice of law as 1) law that pro-
vides a means of resolving litigated disputes, and 2) law that
gives guidance to commercial relationships. For litigation, it
may be acceptable (especially in tort cases) to say that a judi-
cial or other tribunal should have broad flexibility to choose a
law that reflects what it believes to be a fair, acceptable result
for that litigation. Indeed, in the United States, since many
choice-of-law doctrines evolve in judicial decisions made in the
course of litigation or in academic literature focused on litiga-
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tion, that flexibility is a hallmark of most doctrine. At their
core, such doctrines consist of allowing a court to apply a vari-
ety of factors that are differently weighed under different doc-
trines and by different courts. The result in terms of predict-
ability from a perspective centered on planning transactions
before any dispute arises is, in a word, chaotic.31 The benefits
in fair litigation contrast with the detriments of uncertainty in
planning multistate, multinational and global transactions.
If choice-of-law doctrine is addressed from a planning
perspective, the goal is to give parties guidance about what law
states the basis on which they should structure their transac-
tion to achieve its intended effects. This facilitates commercial
relationships and reduces costs for commercial and consumer
commerce. It has been adopted as a primary rule in several
revisions of the Uniform Commercial Code."
In online commerce in information, there is only one rule
that implements the goals of certainty and cost savings associ-
ated with a planning perspective. UCITA provides that rule. It
states that, in the absence of contrary contract terms, the de-
fault choice-of-law rule is that the applicable law is the law of
the place where the licensor is located.33 In effect, an informa-
tion and service provider should be governed by the law of the
origin of the service. UCITA, in adopting a "place of origin"
rule for applicable law in online information commerce, further
provides that:
For purposes of this section, a party is located at its place of
business if it has one place of business, at its chief executive
office if it has more than one place of business, or at its place
of incorporation or primary registration if it does not have a
physical place of business. Otherwise, a party is located at its
primary residence.34
The point is to establish a predictable and discernible basis for
31. See RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 24, at 241 ("(C]hoice-of-law theory
today is in considerable disarray .... [It] is marked by eclecticism and even
eccentricity.").
32. U.C.C. § 4A-507(a)(3) (1998). Section 507(b) expressly rejects any "reason-
able relation" test with respect to the enforceability of agreed choice of law. Id. §
4A-507(b). Choice of law is issuer's location regarding any issue of its liability.
U.C.C. § 5-116(b) (1998).
33. UCITA § 109(b)(1).
34. Id. § 109(d).
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what law applies in electronic commerce as a means of reduc-
ing uncertainty and resulting cost, which both are artifacts of
law under any other rule of law.
The recent draft of the European Union Directive on Elec-
tronic Commerce35 uses a similar approach, at least in part,
for business-business transactions. The draft directive states:
Information Society services should be supervised at the
source of the activity, in order to ensure an effective protec-
tion of public interest objectives; ... to that end, it is
necessary to ensure that the competent authority provides
such protection not only for the citizens of its own country
but for all Community citizens; whereas, moreover, in order
to effectively guarantee freedom to provide services and legal
certainty for suppliers and recipients of services, such Infor-
mation Society services should only be subject to the law of
the Member State in which the service provider is estab-
lished .... 3
Where a company is "established" does not focus on where the
computer or data reside, but on where there is an ongoing
business presence. This rule deals with regulatory scope and
right to control. The draft does not deal with consumer law,
and declines any intent to establish additional rules on private
international law on conflict of laws or the jurisdiction of
courts. Thus, while it goes part way, it leaves large gaps and
uncertainty with sizeable costs.
To understand why the licensor's location is the appropri-
ate rule for online information commerce, imagine the informa-
tion service as at the center (or hub) of a wheel consisting of
numerous spokes, each one of which leads to a client (licensee)
in a different location. The economies of the Internet involving
information and related services transactions lie in part in the
fact that the provider can service clients around the world in a
frictionless, often automated manner from a single location.
Where the subject matter is computer information, this can be
done without even the need for costly and cumbersome delivery
35. Directive 2000/ /EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on cer-
tain legal aspects of Information Society services, in particular electronic com-
merce, in the Internal Market, Interinstitutional File 98/325(COD), 14263/1199 REV
1 (Feb. 28, 2000) [hereinafter Electronic Commerce Directive].
36. Proposed EU Directive, supra note 27, at para. 8.
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systems. Electronic communication through the same medium
through which the contract was formed is an increasingly via-
ble alternative that most information providers expect to be
the dominant delivery system of the very near future.
In this framework, we might imagine three possible
choice-of-law rules. One would identify the applicable law by
referring to some flexible concept, such as choosing the law of
the state with the greatest interest in resolving the issue or
the law of the state with the most significant relationship to
the transaction. Under that approach, what law would govern,
for example, a transaction in which a licensee company based
in Michigan, places an order for information to be delivered
electronically to Texas from a provider located in Maryland?
The answer is not clear. Should the answer change if the order
were placed by the licensee's agent while she attended a meet-
ing in New Jersey? Uncertainty such as this is a cost. It is
difficult to see the commensurate benefit.
A second choice-of-law rule would have the law of the
licensee's state govern the transaction. There are obvious prob-
lems of locating a licensee in the virtual world of Internet or
when the licensee is mobile. Let's put those problems aside.
The more fundamental problem is that this rule would choose
as applicable law the outer ends of each spoke in our hypothet-
ical wheel. For a licensor, sitting at the hub of this wheel, this
has a very specific and costly effect. A rule that presumes that
the transferee's location governs would require 1) that the
information provider learn and comply with the law of all
countries and all states, 2) that it arrange its contracting and
distribution system to forego transactions with persons in
jurisdictions whose law it does not know or to which it does
not wish to conform (if such restrictions are technologically
feasible), or 3) that it simply ignore the law of most states on
the assumption that no bad results will occur from what will
be noncompliance with at least some of those laws.
" Even for the largest companies, learning all states' laws
within the United States and the laws of all countries is
a daunting and expensive task. For ordinary sized com-
panies or for individuals, it is impossible.
* Even if technologically feasible, an approach that re-
stricts online transactions to states whose law the pro-
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vider has learned and will comply with truncates a valu-
able efficiency of Internet information commerce.
Ignoring the laws of most states, while a likely result, is
hardly an effect of a choice-of-law regime about which a
law-maker should be proud.
A third choice-of-law rule would select the law of the state
in which the provider of the information is located. There are
definition problems about where a multifaceted entity is locat-
ed and mobility issues, but these can be overcome. This rule
has several important effects in that it gives guidance for
transactions and reduces costs of legal analysis of foreign laws
and resulting legal risks. The rule eliminates reliance on the
fictions that dominate modern choice-of-law doctrine, such as
determining which state has the dominant interest, or in de-
termining where a contract was created or performed in the
Internet. Also, it creates a stable and identifiable base for
planning and implementing transactions. Rather than a dis-
persed set of legal compliance requirements, the point of origin
rule focuses all transactions for a provider on the law of a
single state or country.
Should this rule apply to consumer transactions?
Some assert that it should not. The apparent reasoning is
that a consumer should have the benefit of being governed by
the consumer's own national or local law. In online electronic
commerce in information, however, that rule would create the
costs and risks described above for any transaction involving a
consumer. If we are to create those costs it would seem that we
should demand an off-setting benefit. An answer to what bene-
37. No approach to this issue is perfect. This rule, for example, creates a risk
that vendors will "race to the bottom," by relocating to jurisdictions where the law
is most beneficial to them. There are many reasons to believe that electronic com-
merce will not experience that. Empirically, for example, corporate governance
issues in the United States are heavily dominated by states such as Delaware
that encourage incorporation in that state. Yet, while Delaware has a sophisticated
corporate law regime, it is not one that benefits corporate insiders at the cost of
others. Also, the risk in electronic commerce would be offset by the frictionless
ability of other entities to compete by offering customers and trading parties more
desirable legal regimes. Additionally, however, UCITA contains a provision which
alters the choice-of-law rule if the effect of applying it would be to select a law
that is fundamentally less protective of the consumer than law that would other-
wise apply. UCITA § 109(c).
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fit is obtained is that this rule is a consumer protection rule,
since consumers are better off being treated under their own
local law. That is misleading. As we have seen, it is sometimes
true and sometimes not true. In many cases, the other law will
be equal or better for the consumer. Consider, for example, a
country that provides no consumer protections at all, but
whose citizens routinely do business with information provid-
ers in the state of Maryland, which has a well-developed con-
sumer protection regime. Is the consumer benefited by having
its own national law govern (with no consumer protections at
all), or would the consumer benefit by having Maryland law
apply?
The consumer issue ultimately is not a question of con-
sumer protection, but one of a state's assertion or retention of
sovereign rights and control in a virtual world where the rele-
vance of distance and physical location are diminished. Elec-
tronic commerce in information highlights this as a major
issue. If assertions of sovereignty in this form are pursued,
they will substantially impede realization of the advantages of
electronic commerce in information and, ultimately, harm the
states that insist on the sovereignty claim. On the other hand,
of course, it is naive to think that sovereign claims or positions
will not be staked out in the virtual world of Internet and
electronic commerce. How this will occur is a major unan-
swered issue in modern commerce. The hope is that sovereign-
ty here will be buffered by the fact that the virtual commerce
systems enable a fluid, international commerce that will move
away from states that impose serious tariffs on it.
Arguably, the default choice-of-law rule could be different
for transactions in goods conducted in the Internet. If the sub-
ject matter of a transaction is goods or other tangibles, the
transaction requires physical delivery to the transferee. Be-
cause of this, there is a greater opportunity for a vendor to
make decisions about where to ship or not ship based on a
particular destination. Yet, even here, the questions must be:
"what social benefits are obtained at the cost of a rule that
requires vendors to forego the international commerce benefits
of electronic systems by excluding some states or some coun-
tries from their commerce?"
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III. ASSENT AND CONTRACT CREATION
Electronic commerce is a commercial fact and a vibrant
marketplace. Yet, it entails a way of doing business that has
not been seen before and with respect to which existing legal
regimes may not be adequately prepared. This latter fact has
led to reevaluations of contract law principles as applied to
computer information environments and, more generally, as
applied to electronic commerce. Many of these studies and
resulting legislation focus on removing barriers to electronic
commerce.
38
The premise of law-reform activity in electronic commerce
has been to promote its growth. A report in the United States
described the relationship between contract law and informa-
tion-based transactions in the following terms:
The challenge for commercial law... is to adapt to the
reality of the NII [National Information Infrastructure] by
providing clear guidance as to the rights and responsibilities
of those using the NIl. Without certainty in electronic con-
tracting, the NII will not fulfill its commercial potential.
[RIegardless of the type of transaction, where parties wish to
contract electronically, they should be able to form a valid
contract on-line.
In particular, on-line licenses should be encouraged
because they offer efficiency for both licensors and licens-
ees ....
... [Tihe Working Group supports the efforts presently
underway to revise Article 2 of the U.C.C. to encompass li-
censing of intellectual property.39
After years of discussion and refinement, the project referred
to in this report emerged as a uniform state law, UCITA. Sec-
tion 106(a) of UCITA states its purposes as including to:
[S]upport and facilitate the realization of the full potential of
38. The principal barriers are often presumed to be grounded in when or
whether an electronic record or an electronic signature satisfies requirements in
law that were developed with respect to paper-based writings and signatures. That
simplistic view, however, ignores a wide range of foundational contract law issues
that are more important for the functioning of the information marketplace.
39. WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INFORMATION INFRA-
STRUCTURE TASK FORCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION
INFRASTRUCTURE 58-59 (1995).
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computer information transactions .. clarify the law govern-
ing computer information transactions ... enable expanding
commercial practice in computer information transactions by
commercial usage and agreement of the parties ... promote
uniformity of the law with respect to the subject matter of
this [Act] .... 40
The most recent draft of the European Union Directive on
Electronic Commerce similarly emphasizes the importance of
promoting electronic commerce.41 The Directive focuses on
promoting e-commerce "locally," that is, among states within
the European Union. Earlier drafts referred expressly to the
competitive advantage for European Union countries and their
internal market vis-&-vis other regions and countries that
could be attained by developing law in this context.42 This
incentive underscores a risk in the law related to electronic
commerce. Information assets are unconnected to physical
location and are supremely movable. One view is that they will
move to the most congenial or supportive locale or, at least, to
avoid environments that are not congenial. But, while this is
true, electronic commerce is not a zero sum enterprise. The
goal should not be to establish one's own sovereign perspec-
tives ahead of those of other states or countries. The goal
should be to create supportive, open-market approaches that
enhance the net overall gain shared by all participants.
40. UCITA § 106(a).
41. Electronic Commerce Directive, supra note 35, paras. 2-65.
42. The 1998 draft proposal was the most explicit on this objective:
The Commission's 1997 Communication on electronic commerce set a
clear objective of creating a European coherent legal framework by the
year 2000. This proposal meets that objective. It builds upon and com-
pletes a number of other initiatives that, together, will eliminate the
remaining legal obstacles, while ensuring that general interest objectives
are met, particularly the achievement of a high level of consumer protec-
tion. This proposal will reinforce the position of the Community in the
international discussions on the legal aspects of electronic commerce
which are currently underway in a number of international fora (WTO,
WIPO, UNCITRAL, OECD). The Community will thus secure a major
role in international negotiations and significantly contribute to the estab-
lishment of a global policy for electronic commerce.
Proposed EU Directive, supra note 27, at 2 (Executive Summary).
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A. Technology Adequacy
Many discussions suggest that the most important con-
tract law issues for electronic commerce deal with the technolo-
gy of electronic commerce and whether contract law permits
use of that technology. Yet, adequacy is the simplest issue of
all, and will become even less difficult as familiarity with and
use of the technology continues to grow. The rule should be:
except in extreme and limited cases, there is no reason to not
allow electronic records and signatures to fulfill former written
requirements. Indeed, I suspect that most courts and regulato-
ry entities, faced with a statutory requirement of a writing or a
signature, would readily conclude that digital equivalents suf-
fice under the same standards as would written equivalents.43
As it has played out, however, the adequacy issue has not
remained that simple; uneasiness about new technologies has
led to potentially harmful proposals that have been adopted in
at least a few states.
1. The General Principle
Issues about electronic adequacy in law involve whether
electronic (digital) files, digital entries, or other digital acts
satisfy requirements of a writing or a signature in cases where
such requirements are imposed by law." While this might
seem to be a core issue, billions of dollars of commerce have
been conducted electronically for over a decade without serious
judicial challenge to the premise that electronics suffice.45
43. Of course, this does not mean that anything electronic will always suffice
for a written or traditional equivalent. For example, the traditional definition of
signature, carried forward into U.C.C. Article 9 and UCITA in the concept of au-
thentication, is that the symbol or act must be taken with an intent to authenti-
cate a record. UCITA § 102(a)(6); U.C.C. § 1-201 (1998). In the absence of that
intent, a symbol does not meet the signature or authentication requirement. Thus,
in Parma Tile Mosaic & Marble Co., Inc. v. Estate of Short, 87 N.Y.2d 524 (1996),
the court held that an identifier line on a facsimile transmission was not a signa-
ture for purposes of New York law where there was no intent that it be a signa-
ture.
44. There are many situations where a writing or a signature may be used,
but is not required by law. For example, under U.C.C. § 2-201, a signed writing is
required to enforce a contract only if the goods to which the contract refers have
not already been delivered. When they have been delivered, that conduct satisfies
the rudimentary documentation purposes of the Article 2 statute of frauds.
45. Among the very few judicial expressions of concern about this issue is
found in Zemco Manufacturing, Inc. v. Navistar International Transportation Corp.,
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Why is this true? One answer is that the commercial world
long ago accepted that electronics suffice. Courts, thus, are
seldom presented with the adequacy issue because the parties
assume that digital surrogates suffice for simple contract law
ideas. When presented with the issue, courts are unlikely to
get it wrong. The world has moved past when the general rule
that digital records supplant paper can be seriously ques-
tioned.
At one level, there is no principled argument that electron-
ic records and electronic signatures should not suffice under
general law requirements of a "writing" or "signature." In
many countries, for example, a signed writing that contains
the contract terms is never required; there is in these countries
no statute of frauds rule. That approach is generally followed
in the United Nations Convention on the International Sales of
Goods, although that convention allows countries to derogate
from this rule." Clearly, where no legal mandate of a writing
exists, "technology adequacy" is not an issue.
In other contexts, general contract law requires a "signed
writing" for enforceability under a statute of frauds." But in
commercial practice, that requirement is no more than a small
impediment to commerce, seldom invoked. Indeed, if one asked
business lawyers how often they had any concern about wheth-
er a transaction conformed to the statute of frauds, none would
say that they ever considered that issue. In that environment,
allowing electronic records and electronic signatures to suffice
186 F.3d 815 (7th Cir. 1999). There, the court held that genuine issues of fact
existed about whether computer printouts allegedly representing extensions of a
contract for sale of machined parts met the signature requirement under the appli-
cable statute of frauds under Article 2 of the U.C.C. The question is whether the
symbol was executed or adopted by the party with present intention to authen-
ticate the writing. Id. at 821.
This court, applying Illinois' version of the UCC, has previously held that
typed initials or a letterhead could suffice as a signature. We cannot say,
on this record, that all of the computer printouts in this case are not
adequately "signed." The name "Navistar" is stamped or typed on some of
these documents. There is an issue of fact regarding whether these mark-
ings were executed with the intention of authenticating the documents.
Id. at 821-22 (citations omitted). Notice, of course, that the issue was not adequa-
cy of electronics, but whether the particular symbols were done with the requisite
intent.
46. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force on Jan. 1, 1988).
47. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-201 (1998).
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for written records and written signatures is not a major policy
change.
At present, at least twenty-five states in the United States
and five countries expressly recognize as a matter of law the
equivalence between electronic "records" and writings in at
least some contexts.48 Both UCITA49 and the draft EU Direc-
tive on Electronic Commerce" adopt the concept of electronic
equivalence. The Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (UETA)
similarly adopts this principle, but limits when it applies.5'
The draft EU Directive provides that
Member States shall ensure that their legislation allows
contracts to be concluded electronically. Member States shall
in particular ensure that the legal requirements applicable to
the contractual process neither prevent the effective use of
electronic contracts nor result in such contracts being de-
prived of legal effect and validity on account of their having
been made electronically.52
UCITA provides: "A record or authentication may not be de-
nied legal effect or enforceability solely because it is in elec-
tronic form.""3
Both UCITA and UETA adopt a convention initiated in the
48. For a collection of state and international law on this issue, see McBride
Baker & Coles, Summary of Electronic Commerce and Digital Signature Legislation
(last updated Mar. 3, 2000) <http://www.mbc.com/ecomynerce.html>.
49. UCITA § 107.
50. Electronic Commerce Directive, supra note 35.
51. Uniform Electronic Transactions Act § 5(b) (1999) [hereinafter UETAL. The
existence or non-existence of an agreement is to be determined from the context,
including the conduct of the parties. As enacted in non-uniform form in California,
the requirement of agreement is much more demanding. The California rule pro-
vides that:
Except for a separate and optional agreement the primary purpose of
which is to authorize a transaction to be conducted by electronic means,
an agreement to conduct a transaction by electronic means may not be
contained in a standard form contract that is not an electronic record. An
agreement in such a standard form contract may not be conditioned upon
an agreement to conduct transactions by electronic means. An agreement
to conduct a transaction by electronic means may not be inferred solely
from the fact that a party has used electronic means to pay an account
or register a purchase or warranty. This subdivision may not be varied
by agreement.
CAL. Civ. CODE § 1633.5(b) (West 1999).
52. Proposed EU Directive, supra note 27, art. 9(1).
53. UCITA § 107(a).
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U.C.C. using the term "record," rather than "writing," a "re-
cord" being defined as "information that is inscribed on a tan-
gible medium or that is stored in an electronic or other medi-
um and is retrievable in perceivable form." 4 UCITA recogniz-
es the equivalence of electronic processing and "traditional"
signatures; this is implemented in UCITA through a new term,
"authentication" which encompasses both electronic and tradi-
tional signatures. That convention has been followed in U.C.C.
Article 9 (dealing with secured transactions). UETA has the
same concept. The model law proposed by UNICTRAL likewise
provides a rule of equivalence. All in all, while the formalities
debate continues, its commercial relevance is reduced and need
not detain us as a matter of general private law. The issue
remains important, however, in the myriad regulatory rules
that in some jurisdictions require writings and have not been
updated to electronic commerce.
2. The "Special" Cases: Commercial
"Solving" the technology adequacy issue has been a consis-
tent theme in contract law revisions on electronic commerce.
As this focus has extended over time, however, the premise
that electronic records and signatures should be paper equiva-
lents has been affected by other issues and has shifted in some
surprising ways. The discussion of equivalence has taken on a
new theme of conflict, grounded in consumer protection issues.
The new theme often belies the issue to which contract
law reform was originally addressed. That issue is that billions
of dollars of commerce occur electronically even though many
laws require a writing or a written signature which, under one
view, cannot be created in the electronic world. Internet and
other electronic interchanges are accepted as fundamental
technology by their users. The new debate, however, often
seems to ignore that and asks, instead, whether there may not
be many cases where electronics should not suffice to meet a
requirement of a writing and, thus, that there should be some
places where electronic commerce cannot function. Debates on
technological adequacy thus have taken on issues associated
with a fundamental uneasiness among some about the modern
economy and the digital environment itself.
54. U.C.C. § 5-102(14); UCITA § 102(a)(58); UETA § 2(13).
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Are some commercial cases so different that the required
"writing" or written "signature" should not be changed by a
general law allowing electronic commerce?
If one asks this question seriously, there may indeed be
some cases where commercial law truly incorporates a policy
that can be met only by a signed paper rather than an authen-
ticated electronic record. To decide when or if this is true would
require that the person asking the question focus on why a
writing requirement made sense as part of the particular rule
and ask whether that policy in fact precludes a rule that elec-
tronic records suffice for the same purpose. For example,
should it be sufficient to make disclosures about proposed
private investments in securities electronically? Can account-
ing records be retained solely in electronic form for an audit?
Are electronic records adequate evidence of a contract in litiga-
tion?
Asked in this way, in most cases, the answer will be that
digital records are sufficient if the proponent or user of the re-
cord can establish the authenticity and receipt of the record.
These same issues, of course, are important for paper records
and signatures.
Yet, in any jurisdiction, there may be literally thousands
of rules in which a statute or a regulation requires a written
record or signature. The practical question becomes: should the
electronic commerce reform approach be that such require-
ments are met by digital equivalents unless the contrary is
proven to be important, or should the approach be that advo-
cates of electronic adequacy must prove their case for each
situation in which an existing rule requires a writing?
The proper answer is that electronic computer systems
ordinarily suffice. A decision that this is not so in reference to
a particular rule should be based on the particular policy un-
derlying that specific rule. It should be up to the proponents of
the exception to make the case that a paper record is actually
required. Digital commerce methods entail low friction and
high speed with resulting cost savings and market options that
do not exist in old commerce. This benefits both the person
acquiring information and the person providing it. Multiple
and often conflicting requirements that might be created
among numerous jurisdictions would encumber an otherwise
transparent and largely frictionless transactional system. This
produces a net loss.
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Each decision that a writing requirement is not satisfied
by a digital record imposes a cost. That cost reduces the bene-
fits that the digital systems enable. If the exceptions expand
among different states and jurisdictions in different ways and
with respect to different rules, the cost multiplies and may
seriously impede commerce. A decision to deny digital adequa-
cy should be reached only if the clear benefits of that choice
exceed the harm it causes. What should happen is that we
should ask why policy-makers in a paper world chose to re-
quire a writing and how should the actual policies influencing
that decision be exported to the modern electronic environ-
ment.
The reality does not always approach this. Most electronic
commerce statutes validate electronic records and electronic
signatures, at least by providing that they should not be de-
nied legal effect because they are electronic. But, often, the
adequacy principle is limited in scope. In some cases, such as
in UCITA, this is a product of the limited substantive focus of
the law. UCITA governs contracts in computer information
transactions, but not goods or personal services transactions.
Its statement of the adequacy principle is thus limited to those
cases. The same will be true if a revised Article 2 containing
electronic commerce rules is enacted. In other contexts, some
statutes take a broad validating approach, but others do so
only within limits. Why this is so is not clear, but works off a
concern about and uneasiness with the new technology and an
inability to come to grips with why any writing requirement
exists in any law. In most cases, the answer to that question is
simply that there was no alternative to paper in cases where
the goal was to require a contract or term to be in a recorded
form.
Broad direct validation of adequacy is most clearly illus-
trated in the European Directive on Electronic Commerce.
This Directive requires countries in the European Union to
remove barriers to enforcement of electronics as equivalent to
paper records and signatures, except in narrow contexts. In
UCITA, as is apparently true in the Directive, the approach is
to validate, as a matter of law, the principle that electronics
55. UCITA § 103(a).
56. Electronic Commerce Directive, supra note 35, art. 9.
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should not be discriminated against in any case where a writ-
ing is otherwise required. The policy judgment is that, in prin-
ciple, there is nothing sufficiently different in legal policy be-
tween a writing (or written signature) and electronic counter-
parts that justifies the costs that different treatment would
impose on electronic commerce. If the parties were to agree to
not treat electronics as being equivalent to paper, that agree-
ment would be enforced. But in the absence of such an agree-
ment, the presumption should be that electronics are not per
se less acceptable than are writings. UCITA provides that: a
record or authentication may not be denied legal effect or en-
forceability solely because it is in electronic form .... In any
transaction, a person may establish requirements regarding
the type of authentication or record acceptable to it.57
UETA takes a different approach. It includes the same
general validation rule, but the effect is different. UETA does
not apply to a transaction unless the parties agree to use elec-
tronic systems for that transaction.58 Furthermore, consent to
electronics that allows application of UETA continues for fu-
ture transactions only if a party does not withdraw its agree-
ment to use electronics. The UETA rule is not that electronics
should not be discriminated against. Rather, the rule is that if
the parties agree to use electronics, law should not discrimi-
nate against the agreed use in cases where the form of the law
requires use of a writing or traditional signature.
What is meant by the requirement that the parties agree
as a precondition to UETA applying at all? One reading would
render the requirement of an agreement meaningless: it would
infer "agreement" in broad terms. An "agreement" is the "bar-
gain of the parties in fact" and can be inferred from all of the
circumstances. Does a business card handed out during a cock-
tail party constitute a "bargain" (agreement) to use electronic
communications if that card contains a physical address and
an e-mail address? One suspects that a court would say "no,"
but some argue that this is enough "agreement" for UETA.59
Yet, if that interpretation works, what does one do with the
U.C.C. concept that an "agreement" is a "bargain" and that the
57. UCITA § 107(a)(c).
58. UETA § 5(b).
59. Id. § 5, Official Comments (1999).
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idea of a bargain seems to be that two parties agree to some-
thing? In any event, if a broad interpretation hinging agree-
ment on the use of a business card is followed, it renders the
statutory requirement largely meaningless. If that were in-
tended, one wonders why the requirement is present at all,
except as a basis for litigation.
If the requirement of agreement was intended to have
substance and bite, then where does that bite fall and why?
Other laws directly declare electronics as adequate (precluding
discrimination against them simply because they are electron-
ic) except in delineated cases. The agreement requirement
transforms the function of the statute: instead of an affirma-
tive public policy statement, it becomes an acquiescence in the
choice of the parties. That is indeed useful, but a person rely-
ing on it must be sure to obtain that agreement.
Under UETA, an agreement to conduct transactions elec-
tronically can be withdrawn and the party can refuse to do so
for other transactions. ° This right to withdraw cannot be var-
ied by agreement. The term "transaction" does not refer to an
overall contract or its performance, but to any specific interac-
tion that involves electronics. Thus, apparently, an assent to
accept notices electronically in an online relationship can be
unilaterally withdrawn after the initial agreement.
3. The Special Cases: Consumer Issues
Although not designated as a consumer protection, the
focus on requiring on-going agreement to use electronic mes-
sages as a precondition for their adequacy under UETA relates
to a concern that broad use of electronics may detrimentally
affect consumers. For some, the adequacy issue seems more
complicated and more threatening in consumer contracts.
Why?
The technical arguments claim that an electronic message
should not suffice for a written notice because the two are
different, but that argument typically leaves the ways in which
they are different unstated, except for general statements that
electronic messages are not given as much attention as written
messages. For me the difference goes the other way: I am actu-
ally more likely to pay attention and respond to an e-mail than
60. Id. § 5(c).
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a form letter. The fact is that many individuals (consumers)
actively use the Internet, computers, and e-mail. Electronic
commerce creates a new and more consumer-friendly market
where myriad potential vendors can be contacted and prices or
services compared with little effort by the consumer. It seems
awkward to compromise those consumer benefits on the altar
of a general concern that the new systems are less vivid than
their paper counterparts, especially since this was not the
policy reason for the rules requiring a writing or a mailing
because no option then existed for electronic message systems.
Of course, I may not have an e-mail address or other elec-
tronic message or recording system that I use. Some say that
this means that generally validating electronic systems is inap-
propriate because some consumers do not use electronic mail
or equivalent systems. Of course, it will always be the case
that some individuals will not use electronic mail or analogous
systems. However, the principle of technological equivalence
does not erase other indicia of whether a notice, record or sig-
nature is effective. A signature requires an intent to sign
(whether electronic or on paper), a record requires some level
of reliability in reproducing the information (whether electronic
or in writing) and a notice must be sent to a location from
which it can reasonably be expected to be received (whether
electronic or otherwise). If I do not have an e-mail address, to
what location could an e-mail notice be sent and still described
in law as a reasonable notice?6 Equating electronics to writ-
ings has no impact on this.
The truth is that, although presented as consumer issues,
the concerns that advocates raise most often reflect their fun-
damental discomfort with the new economy and the idea of
electronic commerce. That discomfort, focused on technology
adequacy, is misplaced. There are important consumer issues
in electronic commerce, but the adequacy of a digital record or
electronic signature is not one of those issues.
The first state to adopt UETA was California. Unfortu-
nately, the California statute broke far from UETA. The Cali-
fornia Act contains a number of rules that address "consumer"
61. The U.C.C. requires that notice entail sending the information in a man-
ner reasonably calculated to be received, an element of the definition of notice
that would seem to be assumed in any system or rule. U.C.C. § 1-201 (1998).
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issues, but that are not limited to consumer cases as the stat-
ute was drafted. Rather than benefit electronic commerce, the
California UETA creates new unwarranted risks and costs.
One California rule limits how a party (consumer or otherwise)
can effectively agree to engage in electronic transactions or to
accept electronic notices in a manner under which the Act will
allow electronics to supplant a required writing. Under this
rule, an agreement is unenforceable if it is contained in a stan-
dard form written contract unless that contract deals solely
with assent to electronic transactions and assent to it is op-
tional. The rule is that:
Except for a separate and optional agreement the prima-
ry purpose of which is to authorize a transaction to be
conducted by electronic means, an agreement to conduct
a transaction by electronic means may not be contained
in a standard form contract that is not an electronic re-
cord.
An agreement in such a standard form contract may not
be conditioned upon an agreement to conduct transac-
tions by electronic means.
An agreement to conduct a transaction by electronic
means may not be inferred solely from the fact that a
party has used electronic means to pay an account or
register a purchase or warranty.
* These rules may not be varied by agreement.62
What interest is protected by this rule? Presumably, the an-
swer is that the Act protects against a concern about over-
reaching and abuse in standard form contracts that allow a
party to send notices by e-mail or the like.63 The justification
62. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1633.5(b) (West 1999).
63. One important point to note is that this rule does not apply if the agree-
ment itself is contained in an electronic record. Presumably, this is because, in
such cases, the consumer or other party knows that it is engaged in electronic
commerce and, thus, a clause providing that further electronic transactions are
permitted cannot constitute a surprise. UCITA does not address this issue, but by
definition all UCITA transactions involve computer information as the transactional
subject matter. UCITA § 103(a).
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hinges on the view that consumers must be protected against
unknowingly agreeing to electronic transactions, but the rule
also applies to business-business transactions governed by
California law.
Of course, written agreements are often in "standard
forms" and they often have terms that deal with to what loca-
tion a notice should be sent and how it should be sent. Sin-
gling out assent to electronic notices or the like is inappropri-
ate and can only be justified by a belief that some people who
have electronic addresses are uncomfortable using them and
should not be allowed casually to agree to do so and that the
applicable law requiring a written notice could not adequately
cope with cases where this is done in an abusive manner.
In a digital economy, the idea that agreements to use
digital messages require special formalities is absurd. It is
even more absurd when, as in California, the special formali-
ties are not limited to consumer transactions. For example, in
a franchise or distributorship agreement, the California rule
seemingly precludes the parties from agreeing in the written
contract (ordinarily a standard form) that future "transactions"
will be electronic (e.g., electronic orders, financial reports).
Five years from now, the idea that one must prove an
agreement to use electronics in order to be legally enabled to
do so will seem quaint. Five years from now, the California
restrictions will have been repealed, ignored by commercial
parties, or viewed as a barrier to electronic commerce in Cali-
fornia.
B. Assent to Contract
Technology adequacy should be a simple question unless it
is embroiled in debates generated by images of the past which
cause some to seek to avoid the future. There are, however,
many significant legal issues in electronic commerce. One con-
cerns choice of law as already discussed.' Another, which we
64. Still another international debate deals with the issue of "attribution."
This is the question of under what circumstances an electronic record or signature
can be said in law to be attributable to a particular party. A number of states
and several countries have adopted so-called digital signature legislation under
which encryption technology of a particular type, when used subject to a certifica-
tion system, creates various presumptions of attribution. Other states grant en-
hanced reliability to certain types of signatures, while still others do not deal with
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briefly discuss here, concerns how an agreement and its terms
can be established in an online transaction.
This issue deals with the concept of assent in contract law.
Many electronic commerce relationships are both created and
performed electronically. In such cases, it is often true that
practice entails electronic presentation of terms with electroni-
cally indicated assent. This indication of assent often is sought
through a mouse click on an "I agree" button (or, when appro-
priate, "I do not agree"). The legal issue is whether this estab-
lishes a binding obligation and whether the electronic terms
are the terms of the agreement.
There is little reason to believe that the electronic acts
indicating assent do not do so. Behavior and non-verbal assent
have long been treated in most countries as adequate to form a
contract and adopt terms relating to that contract.65 Although
there are few cases, all reported cases in the United States
hold that an indication of assent online by clicking "I agree"
forms a contract.66 A Canadian court in Rudder v. Microsoft
Corp. 6 7 reached the same result, holding that a choice of fo-
rum clause in an online agreement controlled the forum (juris-
diction) issue. The court rejected the premise that presentation
of the clause electronically was deficient because of the "click, I
agree" format. While not all terms of the agreement were dis-
played at the same time, the court held that this did not
change the fact that assent was effectively given. There was no
basis to selectively invalidate any particular term. The court
commented:
[P]laintiffs seek to avoid the consequences of specific terms of
their agreement while at the same time seeking to have oth-
ers enforced. Neither the form of this contract nor its manner
of presentation to potential members are so aberrant as to
lead to such an anomalous result. To give effect to the
plaintiffs' argument would, rather than advancing the goal of
"commercial certainty".. . move this type of electronic trans-
the idea of enhanced attribution at all. See RAYMOND T. NIMMER, THE LAW OF
COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY ch. 14 (3d ed. 1997).
65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 19 (1981).
66. See, e.g., Caspi v. Microsoft Network, L.L.C., 732 A.2d 528 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1999); Storm Impact, Inc. v. Software of the Month Club, 13 F.
Supp.2d 782 (N.D. Ill. 1998).
67. Rudder v. Microsoft Corp., 2 C.P.R. 4th 474, Ontario Superior Court (Can-
ada, Oct. 8, 1999).
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action into the realm of commercial absurdity. It would lead
to chaos in the marketplace, render ineffectual electronic
commerce and undermine the integrity of any agreement
entered into through this medium.
On the present facts, the Membership Agreement must
be afforded the sanctity that must be given to any agreement
in writing.
68
UETA does not deal with assent.
UCITA does and embellishes current law in a way that
ensures protection of the person assenting to the contract
terms. UCITA codifies and clarifies common law which holds
that assent can be indicated in various ways, including by
conduct. UCITA requires that, in order for conduct to consti-
tute assent, the conduct must be intentional, must occur with
"reason to know" that the other party will view it as assent,
and must be after the party had an opportunity to review the
contract terms.69 An opportunity to review exists only if the
record or term is made available in a manner that "ought to
call it to the attention of a reasonable person and permit re-
view."" Consistent with general contract law, an opportunity
to review and eventual assent to contract terms does not re-
quire that the party must in fact have read those terms.
The most recent draft proposal for a European Directive
on Electronic Commerce deals with the same issue, but more
in terms of regulated disclosures before the purchaser's "order"
is placed.7' The draft provides "Member States shall ensure,
except when otherwise agreed by parties who are not consum-
ers, that at least the following is given by the [provider] clear-
ly, comprehensibly and unambiguously and prior to the order
being placed by the recipient of the service." The draft does
add on to the list 1) the steps to be followed to conclude the
contract, 2) whether the concluded contract will be filed by the
provider in a public record, 3) the means for identifying and
correcting any input errors in placing the order, and 4) the
languages offered for concluding the contract.
A directive sets out standards for what the member states
68. Id.
69. UCITA § 112.
70. Id. § 112(e)(1).
71. Electronic Commerce Directive, supra note 35, art. 10(1).
20001
BROOK. J. INTL L.
of the EU should do. Viewed in this context, the degree of
difference between UCITA ("opportunity to review" before
assent) and the draft directive is one of approach, rather than
concept. UCITA focuses on a general standard and an opportu-
nity to review important terms, while the draft directive cen-
ters on details, perhaps omitting some that might be important
for achieving the goal of adequate disclosure prior to assent.
The approaches are conceptually similar: before one can
assent to a contract, important terms must be made available
for review.
What acts constitute assent to terms, given an opportunity
to review them?
Under UCITA a party is bound by terms only if it acts in a
way that manifests assent to those terms. This requires con-
duct taken voluntarily with reason to know that the conduct
will indicate assent to the contract as viewed by the other
party. The comments to UCITA state:
Assent in common law and [UCITA] does not require that a
party be able to negotiate or modify terms. But the assenting
behavior must be intentional (voluntary). This is satisfied if
the alternative of refusing the deal or terms exists, even if
refusing terms leaves no alternative source for the computer
information .... Knowledge that behavior will be treated as
assent suffices. Also, actions are treated as assent if a person
has "reason to know" that they will lead the other party to
infer that there was assent. Factors that relate to this issue
include: the ordinary expectations of similar persons in simi-
lar contexts or trade usage; language on a display, package,
or otherwise made available to the party; the fact that the
party can decline and return the information, but decides to
use it; information communicated to the actor before conduct
occurred; and standards and practices of the business, trade
or industry of which the person has reason to know. 2
Some have argued that a double click on an "I agree" icon is
only "fictional" assent that should be ignored. It is not clear
what further indication of assent could be obtained in Internet.
Most likely, however, this argument is disingenuous; the per-
sons using it actually believe that parties should not be bound
by standard forms, even in the online world. But in Internet
72. UCITA § 112 cmt. 3(b).
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commerce, all contracts involve standard forms. Does that then
indicate that contractual terms cannot be agreed to online?
The consequences of such a rule would be draconian and would
contradict the basic notion of contract and the economic reality
of modern information commerce.
How can we reasonably say that law should not support
such contracts? The answer is that law cannot invalidate these
agreements unless we are willing as a matter of policy to stifle
electronic commerce where standard forms are an inherent
part of the transactional context.
Initial drafts of European Union directives on electronic
commerce sought to deal with how assent to an online contract
can be established. In fact, they indicated that issue was a
crucial element of establishing electronic commerce law. That
is true. However, treatment of contractual assent in electronic
commerce has varied over the drafts of the EU Directive and is
not resolved in the current proposed Directive. Early drafts
indicated that establishing when conduct reacting to on-screen
icons and other online indications of assent was a critical ele-
ment of enabling electronic commerce. The most recent draft
directive, however, omits any reference to when a contract is
created."3
The drafts originally addressed the assent issue and, in an
early manifestation, proposed a multiple step requirement that
would have created substantial cost and compliance risks. A
later draft provided that a contract is formed when an indica-
tion of assent is followed by an acknowledgment. The current
draft requires a prompt acknowledgment of an order, but does
not deal with how assent is manifested. The Directive does not
say that acknowledgment is to be treated as assent to the
order. Indeed, it does not say when a contract is formed. This,
apparently, leaves the issue to non-uniform law about when or
whether a contract is formed: for example, is receipt of the
order assent to a contract, or is receipt of the acknowledgment
enough to create a contract?
In the United States, raising this type of issue hearkens
back to archaic common law concepts that have had little or no
relevance in practical commercial contract law for generations.
Those issues are whether an order placed against a posted
73. Electronic Commerce Directive, supra note 35, arts. 9-11.
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price or availability creates a contract, or whether the "order"
is merely an offer to contract on the listed terms? In contrast,
the primary issue in the United States is not what is the offer/
acceptance or when agreement occurs in time, but whether
there was assent to terms from one party or the other. That
issue is addressed in UCITA.
The issue concerns whether a party has assented to terms
in a record provided by the other party. UCITA provides:
A person manifests assent to a record or term if the person,
acting with knowledge of, or after having an opportunity to
review the record or term or a copy of it:
(1) authenticates the record or term with intent to
adopt or accept it; or
(2) intentionally engages in conduct or makes state-
ments with reason to know that the other party or
its electronic agent may infer from the conduct or
statement that the person assents to the record or
term.
Assent requires voluntary conduct with reason to know its
consequences.
This is a concept grounded in ordinary contract law in the
United States. 5 However, the electronic commerce issue is
whether that premise can be reasonably extrapolated to other
countries and other contexts. The issue is not simply a techni-
cal law question. It deals with how and whether parties can
establish terms of agreement regarding use, access to and
other attributes of digital information systems.
IV. SUMMARY
As we have seen, online digital systems create a "death of
distance" and a change in how parties do business and how
people and organizations interact. They affect how law should
be formulated. While changes of the sort we have experienced
often engender desire for regulation, modern information mar-
kets are, and should be, largely defined by agreements and
74. UCITA § 112(a).
75. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 19 (1981).
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other manifestations of market choice, rather than by regula-
tion. If we focus on the computer information industries and
commerce in information and services, we can see a vivid dem-
onstration of how that market context generates an expanding
productivity and a burgeoning diversity in product, service and
opportunity. No regulatory scheme could approximate this.
What from one person's vantage appears to be burgeoning
diversity and vibrant economic activity, is sometimes viewed
from another vantage as a disruptive challenge to the existing
social order and comfortable patterns of business and law. This
essay shows, I think, that the challenge to law is real, but that
the remedy is not to seek a retraction or retrenchment. Even
were that possible, it would be undesirable. But it is not possi-
ble. A genie has left the bottle and has transformed our econo-
my and the way we lead our lives. It blurs legal categories,
eliminates or greatly reduces concepts of location and distance,
diversifies the marketplace, allows small entities to compete
with large entities, and fundamentally calls for new ways of
understanding law and business, as well as their interaction.
I have not even scratched the surface of the issues that the
information economy and the emergence of computer informa-
tion as a significant commercial resource present. As we have
seen, however, they are already being debated and discussed,
with some patterns of tentative resolution emerging. This is an
exciting time for law and lawyers. We have begun to rework
our ideas of law as we respond to the new information econo-
my and the challenges it presents.
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